Florida State University Law Review
Volume 46

Issue 1

Article 5

Fall 2018

Leaving Class Action Plaintiffs with Too Many Legs to Stand on:
The Inconsistent Application of Article III Standing Requirements
in Data Breach Cases
Christina Behan

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr

Recommended Citation
Christina Behan, Leaving Class Action Plaintiffs with Too Many Legs to Stand on: The Inconsistent
Application of Article III Standing Requirements in Data Breach Cases, 46 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. () .
https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol46/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact efarrell@law.fsu.edu.

LEAVING CLASS ACTION PLAINTIFFS WITH TOO MANY
LEGS TO STAND ON: THE INCONSISTENT APPLICATION
OF ARTICLE III STANDING REQUIREMENTS IN DATA
BREACH CASES
CHRISTINA BEHAN
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION
............................................................
THE COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT OF ARTICLE III STANDING........
..........

A. The Troublesome "Injuryin Fact"Element
III.

IV.

V.

VI.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

..........

.................

.......................................................

169
171

173
174

A. Standing Based on Increased Risk of Identity Theft........
............
B. IncreasedRisk of Identity Theft is Insufficient to Meet the Standing
Requirements
..................................................
C. The Negative Impact of the Circuit Split.............................

175

THE SUPREME COURT'S PRECEDENT ON "INJURY IN FACT" REQUIREMENTS......

182

A. Analysis of the Cases and the Stance the Supreme Courts Would Likely
Take on the Circuit Split.........................................
1. Analysis of the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits .....................
2. Analysis of the Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits ......
...........

184
184
188

PROPOSED "INJURY IN FACT" STANDARD TO RECTIFY THE CIRCUIT SPILT..........

189

A. Policy Considerationsfor the Statutory Proposed Standard..............
B. Impact the Proposed Balancing Test Will Have on the Federal Courts......

192
194

CONCLUSION..............................................................

I.

177
180

195

INTRODUCTION

While technological innovations over the past 30 years have made
life more efficient and comfortable, those advances come at a price.
Private information is now exceedingly easier to obtain without the
individual's knowledge or consent. In today's digital age of online
banking, quick-pay by using a phone, and automatic deposits of
paychecks, large amounts of personal information are stored on
online databases. Although these technological advances make life
easier, they put individuals' information at risk to be misused by
criminals. Online hackers make it their job to breach servers carrying personal information, presumably to misuse that information for
their own personal gain.' The companies or agencies entrusted with
storing this private information have a responsibility to keep that
information secure,2 but this can be challenging when highly motivated hackers work around the clock to breach those servers.
* Florida State University College of Law, J.D. Candidate, 2019. Special thanks to
Professor David Landau for guidance throughout the note-writing process. I also thank my
mom and grandma, Mary Behan and Felicia Chiapparelli, for all their love and support.

1.

See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015).

2.

Michael Hooker & Jason Pill, You've Been Hacked, and Now You're Being Sued:

The Developing World of Cybersecurity Litigation, 90 FLA. B.J. 30, 34 (2016).
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As the CEO of Yahoo put it, "[w]hat is clear is that users own their
data and should have control of how their data is used."3 While those
who put their private information in the hands of companies would
like to believe this statement, the 2017 report by Verizon sheds light
on the truth of it. The annual Verizon Data Breach Investigations
Report revealed that in 2016 more than 42,000 security incidents occurred. 4 Among those security incidents were "1,900 confirmed [data]
breaches spanning 84 countries and 20 industries."5 Additionally,
over a billion credential sets were stolen, which is "more than three
times" the rate reported in 2013.6 "Security experts like to say that
there are now only two types of companies left in the United States:
those that have been hacked and those that don't know they've been
hacked."7 This statement was made in 2013 when the annual Verizon
report counted 621 confirmed data breaches for the previous year.'
With the number of confirmed data breaches nearly tripling in the
three years in between reports, it is safe to say that the statement
made in 2013 rings even truer today.
With data breaches come lawsuits. Because data breaches can
reach hundreds, thousands, or even millions of consumers, class action lawsuits are a popular9 and logical strategy in obtaining restitution. Accordingly, since data breaches can affect such a large number
of diverse people, the cases are often filed in federal courts. The federal court system has limited jurisdiction, therefore a threshold matter in class action cases is whether plaintiffs have met Article III
standing requirements.'o While plaintiffs usually have few problems
3. Ross Chainey, Davos 2015: Top Quotes From Day Two, WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 22,
2015), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/01/davos-2015-top-quotes-from-day-two/
[https://perma.cc/4ATK-AUMC].
4. Rick Simon, 'Aha' Moments From the 'Verizon 2017 Data Breach Investigations Report', MCAFEE (Apr. 27, 2017), https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/data-security/
aha-moments-verizon-2017-data-breach-investigations-report/ [https://perma.cc/VUP96TAW].
5. Id.
6. Id. "[C]redential set is the information set that is used to prove the identity of mobile
users in security domains . . . ... SPRINGER, CURRENT TRENDS IN HIGH PERFORMANCE
COMPUTING AND ITS APPLICATIONS 459 (Wu Zeng et al. eds., 2005).
7. Nicole Periroth, The Year in Hacking, By the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2013,
9:10 PM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/22/the-year-in-hacking-by-the-numbers/
[https://perma.cc/ZS7Z-U3EA].
8. Id.
9. See Hooker & Pill, supra note 2, at 34.
10. Sabrina Strong, The Battle Over "Standing" in Class Actions, AM. BAR ASSOC.
(2014), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/
2014/2014_sac/2014_sac/battle_ %o20over standing-in-class-action.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R2WM-Y75A]. Introduction to the Federal Court System, U.S. DEP'T JUST.: OFFS. U.S. ATT'YS,
https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/federal-courts

N5QR-C5PX].

[https://perma.cc/
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stating "a claim upon which relief can be granted,"" a big hurdle they
face is proving that an injury has occurred. 2
In the current digital age, technology is rapidly evolving. Unfortunately, the law does not evolve as quickly. Legislatures are slow to
act and "want a consensus to develop in the public or industry before
writing protective measures into law."' 3 Because of this, courts bear
the burden of first impression and can struggle along the way. Currently, there is a large circuit split on what constitutes an injury sufficient to satisfy Article III standing requirements. 4 The Supreme
Court has yet to weigh in on this issue, resulting in conflicting precedents being set by the lower courts.' This Note will analyze the circuit courts' interpretations of Article III standing as it pertains to the
injury requirement in data breach cases, and it will propose a universal standard which will meet such requirement. Part II of this Note
provides the relevant background and development of Article III
standing. Part III analyzes the current circuit split regarding the injury element of Article III standing. Part IV compares the Supreme
Courts' precedent on the "injury in fact" standard to the circuit split's
analysis on this requirement. Part V recommends an implementation
of a statutory balancing test to fix the circuit courts' inconsistent interpretations. Part VI briefly discusses policy rationales for adopting
said recommendation.

II.

THE COMMON

LAW

DEVELOPMENT OF ARTICLE

III

STANDING

Because the Constitution was envisioned to be living document,
the Framers sought not to spell out every aspect of the law.' The
Constitution provides limited authority to each branch of the federal
government. 7 Article III empowers federal courts with "[t]he judicial
[p]ower of the United States,"' 8 and while this is not defined, the
Constitution specifies that this power extends only to "[c]ases" and
"[c]ontroversies."' 9 The courts take separation of powers seriously,
trying their best not to intrude on the other branches' authority.20
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
12. Id. at 36.
13. Megan Dowty, Life is Short. Go to Court: EstablishingArticle III Standing in Data
Breach Cases, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 687 (2017).
14. Fero v. Excellus Health Plain, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 3d 333, 338 (W.D.N.Y. 2018).
15. Id. at 338-39.
16. See David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution, U. CHI. L. SCH. (Sept. 27, 2010),
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/living-constitution [https://perma.cc/9JDS-JZ4L].
17. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1546 (2016).
18. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
19. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
20. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997). "We have always insisted on
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One such way to do this is to require that plaintiffs establish in their
complaint that they have standing to bring a claim. 2 ' The Supreme
Court has created an "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing," consisting of three elements: 1) the plaintiffs must have suffered
an "injury in fact"; 2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct
of the defendant; and 3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.2 2 Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing these elements because they are the ones bringing the lawsuit. 2 3 Because
standing is a threshold matter to be determined at the pleading stage,
general factual allegations of each element may suffice. 2 4
Put simply, standing elements require that the plaintiffs prove an
injury, that the defendant caused the injury, and that the injury can
be remedied by the courts. In more detail, the second element requires "a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of."2 5 This means that that "the injury has to be fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and
not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not
before the court."2 6 The third element requires that it be "likely,"
rather than "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a
favorable decision."2 7 This means that if the plaintiffs win, they
would receive a remedy from the court that the court is capable of
granting.28 The second and third standing elements are not part of
the circuit split, and therefore, they will not be discussed further in
this Note.

strict compliance with this jurisdictional standing requirement." Id. at 819.
In the light of this overriding and time-honored concern about keeping the Judiciary's power within its proper constitutional sphere, we must put aside the
natural urge to proceed directly to the merits of this important dispute and to
"settle" it for the sake of convenience and efficiency. Instead, we must carefully
inquire as to whether appellees have met their burden of establishing that
their claimed injury is personal, particularized, concrete, and otherwise judicially cognizable.
Id. at 820 (citation omitted).

21.
22.
(quoting
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 818.
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (internal citations omitted)
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
Id.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
Id. at 560.
Id. (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)) (in-

ternal quotation marks omitted).

27. Id. at 561 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43
(1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28.

DAVID SHULTZ, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT 427 (2005).
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The Troublesome "Injuryin Fact"Element

Of the three standing elements, the "injury in fact" element has
proven to give the courts the most trouble, hence the circuit split. To
establish an "injury in fact," plaintiffs must show that they have suffered "an invasion of a legally protected interest" that is "concrete
and particularized" and "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."2 9 All of these elements must be satisfied; it is not enough to
simply plead that a statute has been violated.3 0 To satisfy the "concreteness" element, the injury must be "de facto," meaning it must
actually exist. 3 ' A concrete injury, however, does not necessarily need
to be a tangible injury; 32 intangible injuries-such as freedom of
speech-can be considered concrete injuries. 3 3 In determining intangible injuries, courts are guided by "whether an alleged intangible
harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been
regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American
courts." 34 The concrete injury must also be particularized. 35 A particularized injury means that "the injury must affect the plaintiff in a
personal and individual way." 3 6 The courts seem to agree on how to
interpret these first two elements, as evidenced by such little discussion on them.
For data breach cases, the trouble comes into play with the "actual
or imminent" requirement of the "injury in fact" element. At the
pleading stage, actual injuries are less likely to be disputed because
plaintiffs with actual injuries can provide facts that their injuries
have occurred. 3 7 Imminent injuries are more complex because they
allow room for judicial interpretation. The Supreme Court has given
vague explanations of imminence by generally stating that imminence needs to be an injury that is certainly impending and not too
speculative. 38 While there is not a precise timeline for what certainly
impending requires, the Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs can29.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also City of Los

Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35
(1972).
30. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016).
31. Id. at 1548; see also De Facto, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
32. Id. at 1549.
33. Id.; see Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
34. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
35. Id. at 1548 (holding that "[p]articularization is necessary to establish injury in
fact, but it is not sufficient. An injury in fact must also be 'concrete.' ").
36. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n. 1 (1992).
37. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (stating that tangible injuries
are easier for the court to recognize).
38. Id. at 565 n.2.
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not satisfy Article III standing requirements by merely pleading a
possible future injury that might be likely to occur at some indefinite
time. 3 9 Similarly, the Supreme Court recently held that an "objectively
reasonable likelihood" that an injury will occur waters down and is
inconsistent with the standing requirement that an injury be certainly
impending. 40 Additionally, the Supreme Court has set precedent that
fear of a future harm alone is not an adequate substitute to satisfy the
"injury in fact" requirement of Article III standing. 4' The Supreme
Court has also established that plaintiffs "cannot manufacture standing by choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future
harm that is not certainly impending." 42 Lastly, the Supreme Court
has stated it is "reluctan[t] to endorse standing theories that rest on
speculation about the decisions of independent actors." 4 3 On balance,
these holdings represent the Supreme Court's strong stance on enforcing the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing.
As previously stated, the Supreme Court has set a precedent of
strict compliance with standing requirements so as to not intrude on
the other branches of the government. 4 4 Although this precedent
should be known and followed by the lower courts, some confusion
has resulted between the circuits, thus creating mixed decisions and,
in some jurisdictions, a lowering of the standing requirement. Specifically, the circuits are in conflict as to what suffices as an "injury in
fact" in data breach cases.

III.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

The current circuit split is based on the interpretation of the "imminent" element for Article III standing. The differing interpretations that will be addressed in this Note are derived from recent cases from the First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and
D.C. Circuits. The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits heed a
looser standard, holding that an increased risk of identity theft is a
sufficient injury to meet the standing requirement. The First, Third,
Fourth, and Eighth Circuits are a little stricter, holding that an increased risk of identity theft does not comply with the standing requirements provided by the Supreme Court. This split has subsequently widened over the past ten years because more cases have
been decided inconsistently due to the Supreme Court's lack of ac39. Id.
40. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410, 416 (2013).
41. See id. at 417; see also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972).
42. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 402.
43. Id. at 414.
44. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997).

TOO MANY LEGS TO STAND ON

2019]

175

tion.4 5 Due to this split and the Supreme Court's lack of guidance on
this issue, lower courts are struggling to pick a side.4 6
A.

Standing Based on Increased Risk of Identity Theft

The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have created precedent which allows plaintiffs to pass Article III standing by pleading
that they have an increased risk of identity theft (the "increased-riskof-identity-theft standard"). Starting as early as 2007, the Seventh
Circuit reversed the District Court's ruling in Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp, holding that the plaintiffs-whose personal information, though not misused, had been accessed by an unauthorized
third party-suffered an "injury in fact" based on the increased risk
of identity theft. 4 7 In Pisciotta, hackers gained access to a marketing
company's database which stored its customers' names, addresses,
social security numbers, and drivers licenses. 48 The court considered
the expenses that the class action plaintiffs incurred in trying to prevent their personal information from being used, and it found that
the hackers were "sophisticated, intentional[,] and malicious." 4 9 The
court held that "the injury-in-fact requirement can be satisfied by a
threat of future harm or by an act which harms the plaintiff only by
increasing the risk of future harm that the plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent the defendant's actions."5 0
The increased-risk-of-identity-theft standard became a consistent
precedent in the Seventh Circuit with two notable cases: Lewert v.
P.F. Chang's and Remijas v. Neiman Marcus. In Lewert v. P.F.
Chang's, hackers breached a restaurant's credit card machines in order to obtain customers' card information. 5 ' The plaintiffs provided
that one class member in the suit had four fraudulent charges on his
credit card shortly after dining at the restaurant.5 2 While the class
member's bank stopped the fraudulent charges before they went
through, the court still held that the plaintiffs collectively suffered an
injury of increased risk of identity theft because their data had been
stolen and subsequently misused. 5 3 Considering that fraudulent

45.
46.
2018).
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See Carefirst, Inc. v. Attias, 138 S. Ct. 981 (2018) (denying certiorari).
See Fero v. Excellus Health Plain, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 735, 749-53 (W.D.N.Y.
Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 631.
Id. at 632.
Id. at 634.
Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 965 (7th Cir. 2016).
Id.
Id. at 967-68.

176

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:169

charges had already occurred, the court found it plausible to infer "a
substantial risk of harm from the data breach" with regards to other
class members because it is common for hackers to eventually make
fraudulent charges or assume those customers' identities.5 4 While the
only information stolen was the one customer's card information, the
court rationalized that this information could be used to open new
cards in the customer's name and therefore cause identity theft.5 5
Similarly, in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus, hackers breached the
store's credit card machines and obtained customers' card information, but the hackers did not obtain other information, such as social security numbers or birth dates.5 6 In this case, however, 9,200 of
the 350,000 cards accessed were used fraudulently.5 7 But those pleading in the class action admitted that they were reimbursed for the
fraudulent charges by their banks.5 ' The court relied on the fact that
fraudulent activity had already occurred and ruled that the plaintiffs
sufficiently pled an "injury in fact" due to an increased risk of identity theft.59
The Sixth Circuit followed suit in Galaria v. Nationwide, where
hackers gained access to their customers' names, social security
numbers, dates of birth, and driver licenses.6 0 While the class action
plaintiffs did not report any fraudulent activity, the court relied on
the assumption that the hackers intended to misuse the information
accessed. The defendants arguably agreed, seeing as they offered
their customers free credit-monitoring services and identity-theft
protection for a full year.6 ' Based on this rationale, the court held
that it would be unreasonable to expect the plaintiffs to wait for actual misuse and that a substantial risk of identity theft was enough
to satisfy the standing requirement.6 2
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit found the increased-risk-ofidentity-theft standard persuasive, holding that many plaintiffs meet
their burden under this standard. 6 3 In Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., a
laptop, which contained unencrypted files of approximately 97,000
employees' names, addresses, and social security numbers, was sto54. Id. at 967.
55. Id. The court stated no basis for why it believed credit card information would be
enough to open new accounts. Id.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 689-90 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 690.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 692-93.
Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App'x. 384, 385-86 (6th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 388.
Id.
Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010).
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'

len.6 4 The plaintiffs pled that one of their class members had a
fraudulent bank account opened in his name using his social security number.6 " The bank notified this class member and closed the
account."6 The court found the fraudulent account persuasive and
held that an increased risk of identity theft satisfied the standing
requirement.17
Lastly, the D.C. Circuit also adopted the increased-risk-ofidentity-theft standard. In Attias v. Carefirst, hackers breached the
company's database and obtained access to their insurance members'
names, birth dates, social security numbers, and credit card information.6 8 The breach, however, happened a year before detection,
and the plaintiffs did not plead that any of their members had suffered fraud.6 9 Regardless,
the court still held that the
"[p]laintiffs ... cleared the low bar to establish their standing at the
pleading stage."7 0 The court rationalized that the plaintiffs suffered
an increased risk of identity theft because "[w]hy else would hackers
break into a . . . database and steal consumers' private information"
if not to misuse that information? 7
B. Increased Risk of Identity Theft is Insufficient to Meet the
Standing Requirements
The Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have created precedent
which inhibits plaintiffs from passing the Article III standing threshold by simply pleading that they have an increased risk of identity
theft. Collectively, these circuits have required plaintiffs to prove
that the risk of identity theft is either imminent or certainly impending, which are higher thresholds than the increased-risk-of-identitytheft standard. Starting as early as 2011, the Third Circuit held that
"[a]llegations of 'possible future injury' are not sufficient to satisfy
Article III," but instead, "[a] threatened injury must be 'certainly impeding.' "72 In Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., hackers gained access to
Ceridian's commercial businesses' payroll accounts which held personal information of those businesses' employees. 73 The personal in-

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 1140.
Id. at 1141.
Id.
Id. at 1143.
Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 622-23 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 623.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 628-29.
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 40.
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formation accessed included employee names, social security numbers, dates of birth, addresses, and bank accounts.7 4 While over
27,000 employees' information was at risk due to the breach,"7 the
plaintiffs did not plead that any of those employees had suffered from
misuse of their information.7 6 The court found this evidence extremely persuasive in deciding that the plaintiffs were not imminently at
risk for identity theft, particularly because the breach happened on
or about December 22, 2009, and the plaintiffs filed suit, albeit with
no evidence of misuse of their information, on October 7, 2010.77 Additionally, the court found the plaintiffs' argument of increased risk
of identity theft speculative because it relied on the future actions of
the hacker-an unknown third party.78 While this case was decided
before Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 7 9 it conforms with the Supreme
Court's ideology of not endorsing standing theories solely based on
the speculation of future decisions of independent actors.80
Relatedly, the Fourth Circuit was not persuaded that an increased
risk of future identity theft conformed with Article III standing requirements.8 ' Similar to the facts in Krottner, in Beck v. McDonald, a
laptop containing personal information of 7,400 patients was likely
stolen from a healthcare facility.8 2 The personal information included
patient names, dates of birth, the last four digits of their social security numbers, and their physical description (age, race, gender,
height, and weight). 83 The court unanimously held that the plaintiffs
lacked standing because they provided no evidence that the data on
the laptop was ever accessed or misused. 8 4 The court declined to infer
the intent of the laptop thief and stated that for an injury to occur, an
"attenuated chain" of hypothetical events would have to happen in
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 40, 46.

78. Id. at 42 ("Appellants' contentions rely on speculation that the hacker: (1) read,
copied, and understood their personal information; (2) intends to commit future criminal
acts by misusing the information; and (3) is able to use such information to the detriment
of Appellants by making unauthorized transactions in Appellants' names. Unless and until
these conjectures come true, Appellants have not suffered any injury; there has been no
misuse of the information, and thus, no harm.").

79. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 (2013).
80. Id.
81. Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 266-67 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that an increased
risk of identity theft, along with the cost of measures to protect against it, does not satisfy

Article III standing).
82. Id. at 267. See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010)
(here, a laptop containing personal information of Starbucks employees was stolen).

83. Beck, 848 F.3d at 267.
84.

Id. at 274. No dissenting opinions were voiced.
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which: (1) the thief stole the laptop with the intent of accessing the
plaintiffs' personal information; (2) the thief selected, from the thousands of others in the computer, the personal information of the
named plaintiffs; and (3) the thief attempted to successfully use that
information to steal their identities." The court additionally considered that because the breach occurred in February of 2013, and this
case continued into February of 2017, an imminent threat of future
injury was unlikely because " 'as the breaches fade further into the
past,' the [p]laintiffs' threatened injuries become more and more
speculative." 6 Furthermore, the court refused to infer an increased
risk of future identity theft on the basis that the healthcare facility
provided free credit-monitoring services to the plaintiffs." The court
stated that to presume the healthcare facility believed that the plaintiffs were at risk of identity theft-since they provided these services-"would surely discourage organizations from offering these
services to data-breach victims."8 8

Lastly, the Eighth Circuit created a somewhat stricter standing
precedent than those set by the Third and Fourth Circuits. In SuperValu, Inc., hackers accessed 1,045 of the defendants' grocery stores'
computer networks that held card payment information.8 9 The hackers were able to access customer names, credit or debit card account
numbers, card verification value (CVV) codes, expiration dates, and
personal identification numbers (PINs).90 Out of the sixteen plaintiffs
in the class action, only one of them had fraudulent charges on their
account as a result of the breach. 9' In determining that most of the
plaintiffs did not reach their burden of standing, the court relied on a
report that the plaintiffs introduced, which stated that compromised
credit or debit card information alone generally cannot be used to
open new accounts. 92 Keeping this report in mind, the court dismissed all claims, except for the one plaintiff who had a fraudulent
charge on his account.93 Further, the court stated that the remaining
85. Id. at 275. The Fourth Circuit followed the precedent set by Clapper in rejecting
the "attenuated chain" of events that would have to happen for the plaintiffs' information
to be misused. "[A] highly attenuated chain of possibilities . . . does not satisfy the requirement that threatened injury must be certainly impending." Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410.

86. Id. at 275 (quoting Chambliss v. Carefirst, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 3d 564, 570 (D. Md.
2016)).
87. Id. at 276.
88. Id. The court feared that the organization's extension of goodwill would render
them subject to suit if the plaintiffs' rationale was found to be persuasive. See id.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 766 (8th Cir. 2017).
Id.
Id. at 767.
Id. at 770.
Id. at 774.
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plaintiff could only prevail on the standing requirement for "injury in
fact" if he could show that he was not reimbursed for the fraudulent
charge.94 While this court did not explicitly rule that an increased
risk of identity theft was not a sufficient standard for "injury in fact,"
the court's holding was more consistent with the circuits who did not
find an increased risk of identity theft as a sufficient standard.95
C.

The Negative Impact of the Circuit Split

Circuit splits are hardly a favorable approach to judicial precedent
because they create confusion in the lower courts. This circuit split,
in particular, has created confusion in the district courts and among
the circuit courts. For example, in Fero v. Excellus Health Plan, the
District Court of New York had trouble deciding which side of the
circuit split to take because their circuit court of precedent, the Second Circuit, had not yet weighed in on the issue. The court inferred
that the Second Circuit would find favor with the circuits that heed
the increased-risk-of-identity-theft standard because the Second Cir9 6
cuit favorably cited Galaria.
Further evidence that the district
courts are struggling with the standing precedents is that a majority
of the cases previously mentioned reversed their district court's rulings.9 7 Additionally, while the Seventh Circuit already set the prece94. Id. at 773.
95. See id. at 770. The court acknowledged that other circuits have held that substantial risk of future identity theft is sufficient to constitute a threatened "injury in fact," but
it nevertheless held that the plaintiffs in this case have not passed that threshold. However, if the court was truly ruling on the precedent that an increased risk of identity theft is
sufficient for standing, they would have ruled that these plaintiffs had standing. The circuits upholding this standard have found standing even when a plaintiff has not had their
information misused but where they think the thieves have intent to use it. See, e.g., Galar-

ia v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App'x. 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2016); Attias v. Carefirst,
Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 622, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (where no misuse occurred, but the court questioned why hackers would otherwise try to access this information). Here, the hackers used
the stolen information at least once, therefore confirming their intent and allowing the
plaintiffs to reach the standing threshold based on the increased-risk-of-identity-theft

standard. In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 767 (8th Cir. 2017).
96. See Fero v. Excellus Health Plain, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 3d 333, 339 (W.D.N.Y. 2018).
[T]he Second Circuit favorably cited the Sixth Circuit's decision in Galaria . .
and summarized its holding as follows: "[P]laintiffs had standing to bring
data breach claims when the breached database contained personal information such as 'names, dates of birth, marital statuses, genders, occupations,
employers, Social Security numbers, and driver's license numbers.'"

Id. (quoting Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App'x. 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2017)).
97. See Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 630 (D.C. Cir. 2017); In re SuperValu,
Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 774 (8th Cir. 2017) (reversed the district court's dismissal of one plaintiff but affirmed the dismissal as to all other plaintiffs); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.

Co., 663 F. App'x. 384, 385-86 (6th Cir. 2016); Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc. 819
F.3d 963, 970 (7th Cir. 2016); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 697 (7th
Cir. 2015).
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dent that an increased risk of identity theft is a sufficient standard, a
district court in their jurisdiction still had trouble applying this
standard to the case at hand. In 2007, the Seventh Circuit held in
Pisciotta that even without the plaintiffs alleging an experience of
fraud, the "injury in fact" requirement could still be satisfied if the
plaintiffs could show that they would not be at an increased risk of
future harm absent the defendant's actions." This seems to be a low
threshold, but in 2014, the district court in Lewert held that the
plaintiffs did not reach the increased-risk-of-identity-theft standard
or the certainly impending injury requirement for standing.99 Even
though some plaintiffs had incurred identity theft, no fraudulent
charges were incurred.' 00 This court cited to Clapper stating that
"[s]peculation of future harm does not constitute actual injury." 0
While the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's holding as it
was inconsistent with their low threshold, this confusion shows that
the lower courts are unsure about how to use the increased-risk-ofidentity-theft standard, even when their jurisdiction has created
binding precedent.
Likewise, the circuit split has also proved to confuse the circuit
courts themselves. In SuperValu, Inc., the Eighth Circuit referenced
the circuit split but then stated that while courts come to different
conclusions on the question of standing, it did not "need [to] .

.

. rec-

oncile this out-of-circuit precedent because the cases ultimately
turned on the substance of the allegations before each court." 0 2 This

understanding of the circuit split implies that courts are working under one standard for standing, which is untrue considering the entire
split is based on which standard is acceptable. Also, the circuit courts
proved to be confused about the standing precedent set in Clapper. In
Lewert, the Seventh Circuit stated that "[t]he plaintiffs 'should not
have to wait until hackers commit identity theft or credit-card fraud
in order to give the class standing, because there is an "objectively
reasonable likelihood" that such injury will occur.' "103 Nowhere in
Clapper does the Supreme Court make this assertion. If anything,
the Supreme Court states that an objectively reasonable likelihood
standard is insufficient to find standing.1 04

98. Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007).
99. Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., No. 14-cv-4787, 2014 WL 7005097, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2014).
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013)).
102. In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 769.
103. Lewert, 819 F.3d at 966 (incorrectly quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410).
104. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410.
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Lastly, circuit splits also promote plaintiffs to forum shop. 0 5
Plaintiffs might be inclined to file their complaints in certain forums
that have established a lower standing threshold, because these forums would likely allow their case to continue, where other forums
might dismiss it at the pleading stage for lack of standing.

IV.

THE SUPREME COURT'S PRECEDENT ON "INJURY IN

FACT"

REQUIREMENTS

As outlined in the cases discussed above, since the Supreme Court
denied certiorari to many arguably injured plaintiffs on this issue, it
is unclear which side of the circuit split they would follow. 0 6 But if
past Supreme Court cases relating to Article III standing are any indication of the justices' preferences, it would likely be true that the
Court would rule in favor of the lower courts that do not find the increased-risk-of- [future] -identity-theft standard sufficient. The two
most recent and relevant cases that support this assertion are
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins and Clapper v. Amnesty International USA.
In Spokeo, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's determination that a plaintiff had standing because his statutory rights
were being violated, and that his claim was personal and individual.' 0 7 The Supreme Court held that simply filing suit based on a statutory right does not mean a plaintiff automatically satisfies the "injury in fact" requirement.' 0 8 While Congress may grant the authority
to sue for certain harms,' 09 the plaintiff still needs to meet the "injury
in fact" element to satisfy standing because the violation of a statutory right alone may result in no harm."o The holding in Spokeo could
have provided the lower courts with the understanding that the Supreme Court intends to strongly enforce all elements of the Article III
standing requirements.
Likewise, the Supreme Court in Clapper provided some guidance
that the Article III standing requirements pertaining to "injury in

105.

Forum-shopping is defined as:

The practice of choosing the most favorable jurisdiction or court in which a
claim might be heard. A plaintiff might engage in forum-shopping, for example,
by filing suit in a jurisdiction with a reputation for high jury awards or by filing
several similar suits and keeping the one with the preferred judge.
Forum-shopping, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
106. See, e.g., Carefirst v. Attias, 138 S. Ct. 981 (2018).
107. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1544-45 (2016).
108. Id. at 1545.
109. Id. at 1549.
110. Id. at 1549-50.
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fact" are not to be watered down by the lower courts."' In Clapper,
the plaintiffs wanted a declaration claiming United States surveillance actions were unconstitutional." 2 The plaintiffs consisted of attorneys and human rights organizations who argued that their sensitive communications with individuals outside of the United States
would be compromised by this surveillance.11 3 While no evidence evidenced that the United States had intercepted these particular plaintiffs' communications, the plaintiffs stated that the intrusion was
likely to happen in the future.11 4 The plaintiffs also claimed that they
had standing based on the expenditures they had incurred in trying
to protect the confidentiality of their communications." 5 The Second
Circuit held that the plaintiffs had standing because there was an
"objectively
reasonable
likelihood
that
their communications ... [would] be intercepted . . . at some point in the future,"" 6
and because the plaintiffs are suffering present "injuries in fact"
stemming from the fear of future harm." 7 The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's holding and reaffirmed their strong
stance that the threat of future injury must be certainly impending." 8 The Supreme Court thought the plaintiffs' fears were speculative, and not certainly impending, because they failed to offer any
evidence that their communications had been monitored by the United States." 9 Additionally, the Supreme Court thought that an attenuated chain of events would have to happen for the plaintiffs' information to be misused. The Court stated: "[H]ighly attenuated chain[s] of possibilities[] do[] not satisfy the requirement that
20
threatened injur[ies] must be certainly impending."o
Lastly, the
Court stated that the plaintiffs "cannot manufacture standing merely
by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical
'

2
future harm."'

111. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 416 (2013).
112. Id. at 406.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 407.
115. Id. at 407 (The plaintiffs claimed that to keep their communications confidential,
they would have to "travel abroad in order to have in-person" communications with their
clients).

116.

Id. at 410.

117. Id. at 407. The "present injuries" were economic harms from paying for flights and
professional harms from their diminished ability to obtain and communicate confidential
information. Id. at 406-07.

118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

416.
411.
410.
416.
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Analysis of the Cases and the Stance the Supreme Courts Would
Likely Take on the Circuit Split
1. Analysis of the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits

With the preceding discussion in mind, the Supreme Court would
likely find more fault than favor with most of these circuits' analyses.
Starting with the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits-which
hold that the increased-risk-of-identity-theft standard is sufficient to
meet the standing requirement-the Supreme Court would likely
find favor in the balancing test used by some of these circuits. In
Lewert, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs established an
increased risk of identity theft because, after hackers accessed the
restaurant's credit card database, one of the class members experienced credit card fraud. 2 2 The Supreme Court might find this set of
events persuasive because an actual injury occurred, rather than a
mere fear of a future injury which is uncertain to happen.1 23 The Supreme Court suggests that while fear of a future threat alone is insufficient to create standing, claims of a specific, present, objective
harm might suffice.1 2 4 In Lewert, the database was breached and a
class member suffered from credit card fraud; therefore, a harm was
present. This harm solidified the fear of future threat because that
fear was based on a concrete harm.'2 The Supreme Court, however,
might be weary of finding that a class as a whole has standing where
only one plaintiff has incurred an injury. Regardless, the balancing of
events displayed by the Seventh Circuit would be a more favorable
approach than others used on this side of the circuit split.
Not all cases, however, are as rationally reasoned. A common rationale in these circuits is the assumption that the hackers' purpose
in infiltrating the databases is to steal the plaintiffs' information to
misuse it. 26 Some of these cases have only the bare fact that a database was breached, yet some courts still hold that the plaintiffs are at
an increased risk of identity theft. This is true even where no plaintiff had claimed fraud as a result of the breach.' These circuits rely
122. Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 967 (7th Cir. 2016).
123. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 417-18 (referencing Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11
(1972)).
124. Id. at 418.
125. Lewert, 819 F.3d at 967.
126. See, e.g., Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 628-29 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Galaria v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App'x. 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2016); Lewert, 819 F.3d at 967;
Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010); Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l
Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2007).
127. See, e.g., Attias, 865 F.3d at 626; Galaria,663 F. App'x. at 388; Pisciotta,499 F.3d
at 634.
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on this assumption to make the argument that the plaintiffs are at
an increased risk of identity theft because "[w]hy else would hackers
break into a .

.

. database and steal consumers' private information"

if not to steal the plaintiffs' information and commit identity theft."
While common sense might find this reasoning persuasive, hackers
have proven to have different motives when infiltrating databases.
For instance, in 2015, a group called "Impact Team" hacked the Ashley Madison website.'29 Ashley Madison was an online dating website
which glorified having affairs, and accordingly, the website connected
users interested in extramarital affairs.1 3 0 While the website charged
for user access and therefore contained payment information in its
database, the hackers let it be known immediately that their intent
in hacking the system was solely to shut it down for moral reasons.131
The hackers gave the website owners a timeframe to shut down operations, and when the threat was ignored, the hackers released information for over thirty-two million users.1 3 2 This information contained usernames, first and last names, email addresses, passwords,
credit card information, addresses, phone numbers, and transaction
records.1 3 3 The hackers were sophisticated and had the information
necessary to defraud the users, but they had moral rather than monetary reasons for releasing the information. These types of hackers
are known as hacktivists, and they have been involved in morallymotivated hacks as early as the 1990s.1 34

Additionally, the Supreme Court might find fault in the D.C. Circuit's holding in Attias. In Attias, hackers obtained personal information such as birth dates, social security numbers, and credit card
information.1 35 While no class members provided evidence of fraud,
the court held that the plaintiffs "cleared the low bar to establish

128.

Attias, 865 F.3d at 628.

129. Eric Basu, Cybersecurity Lessons Learned from the Ashley Madison Hack, FORBES
(Oct. 26, 2015, 11:55 AVI), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericbasul2015/10/26/cybersecuritylessons-learned-from-the-ashley-madison-hack/#19b883264c82 [https://perma.cc/6K27-BGVTJ.

130.

Id.

131. Id. ('The hacking group purposely targeted the site because they profit 'off the
pain of others,' the stated reason for the group's attack on the site.").

132.

Id.

133. Swati Khandelwal, Ashley Madison to Pay $11.2 Million to Data Breach Victims,
HACKER NEWS (July 16, 2017), https://thehackernews.com/2017/07/ashley-madison-databreach.html [https://perma.cc/58T2-W4XW].
134. Elizabeth Falconer, Ashely Madison Breach: Hacktivists or Criminals?, N.C.
J.L. & TECH. (Sept. 17, 2015), http://ncjolt.org/ashley-madison-breach-hacktivists-orcriminals/ [https://perma.cc/Y38D-2VKB]. In the 1990s, a hacking group called "Cult of
Dead Cow" breached databases to "leverage[ technology to advance human rights and
protect the free flow of information." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

135.

Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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their standing at the pleading stage." 3 6 The Supreme Court has set a
precedent of strict compliance with standing requirements so as to
not intrude on the other branches of government, and therefore,
would likely find fault with this circuit's treatment of Article III
standing.1 37 While the pleading stage presents a lower hurdle than
the trial stage,1 38 it is one of the most important stages of litigation
because it ensures that the judiciary is not overstepping its power.1 39
In Attias, the plaintiffs only pled that a breach occurred and reasoned
that the hackers must have intended to misuse the information they
obtained because "[w]hy else would hackers break into a .. . database
and steal consumers' private information."1 4 0 Further, the breach had
occurred nearly one year before the company noticed the intrusion.141
The Supreme Court would likely find that if fraud did not occurr in
the one year before detection of the intrusion, then future harm
would not be imminent and therefore does not satisfy Article III
standing.
Lastly, the Supreme Court would likely find fault in the Sixth Circuit's holding in Galaria. The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs
were at an increased risk of identity theft because hackers gained
access to personal information that could be used to open new accounts.1 42 This court assumed the hackers would use the information
to defraud the plaintiffs and found standing on the basis that the
plaintiffs incurred an "injury" due to the time and money spent monitoring their accounts for fraud.1 43 The court gave little value to the
136.
137.
138.

Attias, 865 F.3d at 622.
See Raines v. Bryd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997).
See Alexander A. Reinert, The Burdens ofPleading, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1767, 1772

(2014). Ashcroft v. Iqbal created:
[A] two-step process for evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint. First, courts
must review each allegation in a complaint and exclude from consideration
those allegations stated in a 'conclusory' fashion. Second, and consistent with
Twombly, courts must conduct a plausibility analysis that assesses the fit between the nonconclusory facts alleged and the relief claimed. The judge may
assess plausibility by calling on her 'judicial experience and common sense . . . .'
Id. (footnotes omitted). "In sum . . . plausibility pleading depends on the judge to
conduct a preliminary evaluation of the likelihood of a claim's success." Id. This is a
lower standard than the burden of proof at trial, because at trial, the plaintiffs have
the affirmative duty to prove the facts alleged in the complaint. See Burden ofProof,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).

139.

See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997). "We have always insisted on

strict compliance with this jurisdictional standing requirement." Id. at 819.

140. Attias, 865 F.3d at 628-29.
141. Id. at 623.
142. See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App'x. 384, 386 (6th Cir. 2016).
143. Id. at 388 ("Where [p]laintiffs already know that they have lost control of their
data, it would be unreasonable to expect [p]laintiffs to wait for actual misuse-a fraudulent
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fact that the defendant paid for one year of credit-monitoring services
for the plaintiffs, as the court considered the plaintiffs paying to monitor their accounts an injury.'4 4 The Supreme Court would likely find
great flaws in this case because it has set strict precedent that plaintiffs cannot manufacture standing by presenting self-inflicted injuries
alone.1 4 5 Since no fraud actually occurred, and the Sixth Circuit
strictly relied on the intentions of third parties, paired with the
plaintiffs' self-inflicted injuries, the Supreme Court would likely take
a strong stance against this type of standing precedent because it is
completely contrary to its opinion in Clapper.14 6
These circuits, which have held Article III standing to be satisfied
by proving an increased risk of identity theft, have seemingly lowered
the standing threshold. While some circuits have ruled consistently
with the threshold requirements set by the Supreme Court,1 4 7 others
are allowing plaintiffs to have standing with the bare assertion that a
data breach has occurred.1 48 The reasoning of these circuits-that
those who breach databases containing personal information must
have the intent of misusing it-blatantly opposes the Supreme
Court's stance that that it will not "endorse standing theories that
rest on speculation about the decisions of independent actors." 4 9 Additionally, while some circuit courts find it unreasonable to have
plaintiffs wait for fraud to occur,15 0 the Supreme Court would find
fault in watering down the standing threshold by not following the
charge on a credit card, for example-before taking steps to ensure their own personal and
financial security . . . .").

144.
145.

See id. at 386.
Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 402 (2013).

146. See id. ("[R]espondents cannot manufacture standing by choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending."). See also id. at
414 ("We decline to abandon our usual reluctance to endorse standing theories that rest on
speculation about the decisions of independent actors.").

147.

See, e.g., Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 966 (7th Cir.

2016). This court balanced a data breach occurrence on a credit card database with a customer's credit card subsequently incurring fraud to come to the assertion that other members of the class are at an increased risk of identity theft. Id. at 967. This is consistent with
the Supreme Court's analysis that fear of future injury needs to be imminent. See Clapper,

568 U.S. at 418 (citing Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972)). If some customers are
already suffering from fraud, then it is a rational argument that others might imminently
incur the same fate.

148. See Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 626 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Galaria, 663 F.
App'x. at 388; Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007).
149. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414.
150. See Lewert, 819 F.3d at 966. This court somehow misquotes Clapper by stating,
"[t]he plaintiffs 'should not have to wait until hackers commit identity theft or credit-card
fraud in order to give the class standing, because there is an "objectively reasonable likelihood" that such injury will occur.'" Id. Nowhere in Clapper does the Supreme Court make
this assertion. If anything, the Supreme Court states that an objectively reasonable likelihood standard is insufficient to find standing. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410.
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imminent or certainly impending standard for a future injury, because in effect, these circuits are intruding on the power of other
branches of government.''
2. Analysis of the Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits
Switching to the other half of the circuit split, the Third, Fourth,
and Eighth Circuits have created precedent which refuses to allow
plaintiffs to pass the Article III standing threshold by simply pleading that they have an increased risk of identity theft. These courts
hold that plaintiffs must show imminent or certainly impending
threats of future injury. 5 2 The Supreme Court would likely find
that these circuits heed the Court's precedent set for determining
standing in future injury cases. Looking at Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.,
the Supreme Court would agree that these plaintiffs did not have
standing because, while personal information (such as social security numbers, names, and dates of birth) were accessed by hackers in
December of 2009, fraud was not reported when the plaintiffs filed
their complaint in October of 2010.153 Additionally, it was unknown
if the hackers read, copied, or understood the data;1 5 4 thus, the court
chose to follow the Supreme Court's precedent and held it was too
speculative to base standing on the future actions of unknown third
parties.1
Likewise, the Supreme Court would likely agree that the Fourth
Circuit was following the proper standing precedent. In Beck, the
Fourth Circuit refused to find standing when the plaintiffs based
their entire argument on the future actions of unknown third parties. 5 6 Similar to Krottner, a laptop was stolen containing the plaintiffs' personal information, specifically their social security numbers,

151. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410, 416. "[T]he Second Circuit's 'objectively reasonable
likelihood' standard [that plaintiffs will suffer an injury in the future] is inconsistent with
our requirement that 'threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury

in fact.'" Id. at 410. See Raines v. Bryd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997).
152. See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 2017) (using the imminent
standard for standing); Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 270-71 (4th Cir. 2017) (using the
imminent standard for standing); Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011)
(emphasis added) (using the certainly impending standard for standing).

153. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 40-42.
154. Id. at 40.
155. Id. at 42. See also Clapper, 568 U.S. at 402 ("[R]espondents cannot manufacture
standing by choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is
not certainly impending."); see also id. at 414 ("We decline to abandon our usual reluctance to endorse standing theories that rest on speculation about the decisions of independent actors.").

156.

Beck, 848 F.3d at 275.
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dates of birth, and names."' Krottner is distinguishable, however, because the intent of the hacker could be inferred. Shortly after the laptop was stolen, the hacker attempted to open a fraudulent account in
one of the plaintiffs names."' In Beck, however, no fraud was reported, which requires the court to assume the intent of the hacker. 9 This
assumption would go against the precedent set forth in Clapper; therefore, the Supreme Court would likely agree that bare allegations of
theft of an item with personal information on it is not enough to satisfy
the Article III standing requirement of "injury in fact." 60
Lastly, the Supreme Court would also likely agree that the Eighth
Circuit is upholding the strict standards of Article III standing. In
SuperValu, Inc., hackers accessed customer card information by
hacking into the store's payment database.' 6 ' The information obtained was limited to customer names, credit or debit card account
numbers, expiration dates, CVV codes, and PINs.1 6 2 The court took
into consideration that one member of the class had experienced
fraud, but it nonetheless held that all other members did not have
standing because the hackers did not have access to information to
create new accounts.1 63 Therefore, any future injury would likely be
limited to credit or debit card fraud and not identity theft.1 6 4 It can
also be inferred that this court did not find the future threat imminent because the breach happened almost a year before the plaintiffs
filed suit, and because only one fraudulent transaction had occurred
with one class member.16 5 Additionally, to remain eligible for standing, the plaintiff the court granted standing to, must prove that he
was not reimbursed for the fraudulent charges. 66
V. PROPOSED "INJURY IN FACT" STANDARD TO RECTIFY THE CIRCUIT
SPILT

The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of imminence is
"to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III
157.

Id. at 267. See also Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir.

2010) (A laptop was stolen containing personal information of Starbucks employees).

158.
159.
160.

Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1141.
Beck, 848 F.3d at 274.
See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410 ("[H]ighly attenuated chain[s] of possibilities [do] not

satisfy the requirement that threatened injury must be certainly impending.").

161. In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 766 (8th Cir. 2017).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 770.
164. Id. at 771.
165. Id. at 766-67 (The initial breach occurred in August of 2014, and the plaintiffs
filed their consolidated complaint in June of 2015).
166. Id. at 773.
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'

purposes-that the injury is certainly impending."' 6 ' Although the Supreme Court set precedent stating that relaxing this standing requirement is improper, the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits
are having trouble following suit. ' Because the circuits are still having trouble with the "injury in fact" requirement of Article III standing, even with Supreme Court's precedent, this Note recommends
that statutory provisions be adopted for the courts to follow. These
provisions will only cover the imminent standard for future injuries,
which should be followed for data breach class action cases. As noted
in Spokeo, Congress is well positioned to identify intangible harms
that meet the minimum requirements of Article 111.169 The likelihood
of future injuries is seemingly an intangible harm because the injuries do not actually exist yet. 7 0 Since these injuries are not present,
they are harder to recognize but can still be considered concrete for
the purposes of Article III standing. 7
By combining the circuit courts' analysis and the precedent set by
the Supreme Court, a statutory solution for federal standing requirements can be developed, and accordingly, should be implemented by means of a balancing test. This Note proposes the following
balancing test:
1). As required by all courts, some sort of breach or unauthorized
access of personal information must be established. 7
2). A determination of whether the type of information stolen
would allow the unauthorized accessor the ability to open fraudulent accounts.1 73 If the information is simply credit card infor167. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 (1992)).
168. See id. at 416.
169. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
170. See id. at 1548-49.
171. Id. at 1549.
172. See Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding an injury has
not occurred when there is only a fear of a future data breach). This court cites to the circuit split but states that in each case plaintiffs' data had been accessed by one or more
unauthorized third parties. Id.

173.

In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 770 (8th Cir. 2017) ("The type of data com-

promised in a breach can effectively determine the potential harm that can result." (quoting U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-737, PERSONAL INFORMATION: DATA
BREACHES ARE FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF RESULTING IDENTITY THEFT IS LIMITED;
HOWEVER, THE FULL EXTENT IS UNKNOWN (2007), http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/
262899.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WS2-FVWD])). This court states that credit card information
alone-particularly information involving account numbers, names, CVVs, expiration
dates, and PINs-leave plaintiffs in "little to no risk that anyone will use the [c]ard
[i]nformation stolen in these data breaches to open unauthorized accounts in the plaintiffs'
names, which is 'the type of identity theft generally considered to have a more harmful
direct effect on consumers.' " Id. (quoting U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-737,
supra).
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mation, in which new accounts cannot be created, then the plaintiffs need to provide evidence that they have incurred fraud and
that their card issuers have not reimbursed them. 4 Otherwise,
standing should not be granted.
3). The courts cannot infer the intent of third parties who improperly access personal information."' The courts will need some form
of substantive proof, like personal information being hacked and
subsequently used in some way."' This requirement will prove
that the intent of the third parties was to misuse the information.
4). The courts can take into consideration expenditures that the
plaintiffs have incurred in trying to protect their accounts and
identities, but this cannot be the sole source of injury arising from
the breach."'
5). The courts must consider the time frame in which the breach
occurred and when the complaint was filed. Certainly impending
or imminent standards for standing need to be followed. While
hackers can sit on information for weeks before misusing it,"' a
year or longer between the breach and the fraudulent activity is
not imminent.' 9

174. In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 773 (holding that the plaintiff who experienced
credit card fraud had standing, but if evidence proved that he had been reimbursed for the
fraudulent charges, standing no longer exists); see also Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp.,

LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696-97 (7th Cir. 2015). While some card companies offer its customers
zero liability policies, under which the customer is not liable for fraudulent charges, zero
liability is not a federal requirement. The courts should not assume that all card companies
will reimburse their customers. Id. at 697.

175.

Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 (2013). See id. at 402. The Su-

preme Court is reluctant to make speculations about the decisions of independent actors.
Id. at 414. See also Falconer, supra note 134 (Some hackers have a moral purpose behind
accessing personal information, such as the "hacktivists" in the Ashley Madison data
breach).

176.

See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42-43 (3d Cir. 2011). This court found

that a data breach where hackers had access to only the plaintiffs' personal information
(such as social security numbers, dates of birth, and names) was not enough to prove an
injury for Article III standing purposes. The court declined to infer the intent of the hackers and stated that a chain of events would have to occur in which the hackers read and
understood the information, intended to use the information, and then successfully used
the information to the plaintiffs' detriment. This chain of occurrences was too speculative
to confer standing. Id. at 46.
177. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 402 ("[R]espondents cannot manufacture standing by
choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is not certainly
impending.").

178.

See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2015). A

plaintiff used her card in the store in December of 2013 and found fraudulent charges on
her card in January of 2014. Id. at 691.

179.

See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274-75 (4th Cir. 2017) ("[T]he passage of

time without a single report from [p]laintiffs that they in fact suffered the harm they fear
must mean something." (quoting In re Zappos.com, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 958 (D. Nev.

2015))).
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6). Lastly, the court needs to consider if any fraud has occurred
and on how many instances.' 80

All in all, these elements are meant to reduce the number of complaints making it past the pleading stage due to certain circuits lowering the "injury in fact" requirement of Article III standing. While
fraud is not required to prove a future injury, some sort of substantive proof that the hackers intended to access the information to misuse it needs to be present; otherwise, the future injury is too speculative. While these standards might stifle plaintiffs' opportunity to proceed with their cases, the standards proposed are meant to preserve
the court system for those plaintiffs who truly have future injuries,
as well as properly extract funds from those companies who were
trusted in preserving the confidentiality of the plaintiffs' personal
information. Although not every case can be heard, there needs to be
a substantial limit to the ones passing through without merit.
A.

Policy Considerationsfor the Statutory Proposed Standard

One of the biggest policy reasons for creating a uniform standard
that limits the amount of cases allowed to continue past the pleading
stage is the fact that the court systems are overloaded. Recently, as
many as 330,000 civil cases were pending in the federal district
courts.' 8 ' According to the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, this large number of pending cases is up nearly 20 percent
since 2004.
Further, over 30,000 cases have been waiting for their
day in court for three years or more.1 8 3 While the Seventh Amendment provides plaintiffs in civil cases with the right to a jury,1 8 4 the
Sixth Amendment give defendants in criminal cases the right to a
speedy trial.
Due to these standards, "[c]riminal cases often displace and delay civil disputes, creating a backlog."' 8 6 As such, district
court judges are struggling with this issue. One judge stated:
Over the years I've received several letters from people indicating, 'Even if I win this case now, my business has failed because of

180. See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 2017).
181. Joe Palazzolo, In Federal Courts, the Civil Cases Pile Up; Record Number of
Pending Actions Delays Some Suits for Years, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2015, 2:09 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-federal-courts-civil-cases-pile-up-1428343746
[https://perma.cc/737S-SUH2].
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
185. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
186. Id.
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the delay. How is this justice?' . . . And the simple answer, which I
cannot give them, is this: It is not justice. We know it." 8 7

The courts need legislative help to implement a uniform system to
weed out the cases that cannot allege an injury from the cases with
merit.
Another policy consideration in favor of this balancing test is that
class action cases tend to benefit too many uninjured parties.'88 As
shown in this circuit split, a whole class can gain access to the court
system because one plaintiff suffered an injury, while other, similar
cases may be denied access to the courts .89 However, even if the suit
prevails or decides to settle, "very few potential class members ever
see a dime from class actions supposedly brought on their behalf." 90
Lawyers-another group of uninjured parties-always get paid if the
case is awarded an amount of money, regardless of if the case is resolved at trial or in settlement.' 9 ' The proposed balancing test above
would help eliminate some of these problems by requiring the courts
to consider if the class is certifying itself based on one isolated instance of fraud.9 2 This consideration will allow the actual injured
party to seek out the court system individually and prevent large
awards that ultimately go to a few class members and lawyers.
Additionally, this balancing test will save companies and shareholders the expense of litigating meritless cases. When companies
are hit with a lawsuit, it affects the shareholders as well.1 9 3 It has
become common for businesses to try to settle these lawsuits for fear

187. Id. (quoting Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill, sitting on the Eastern District of California) (internal quotation marks omitted).
188. See Daniel Fisher, Study Shows Consumer Class-Action Lawyers Earn Millions,
Clients Little, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2013, 8:46 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/
2013/12/11/with-consumer-class-actions-lawyers-are-mostly-paid-to-do-nothing/#35b702651472
[https://perma.cc/LTN4-6XPX].

189. See Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 969-70 (7th Cir.
2016); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 2010).
190. See Unstable Foundation:Our Broken Class Action System and How to Fix It, U.S.
CHAMBER: INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (Oct. 24, 2017), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/
research/unstable-foundation-our-broken-class-action-system-and-how-to-fix-it
[https://perma.cc/4W8F-LAEL].
191. See Daniel Fisher, supra note 188 ("When consumer class actions do settle, lawyers usually negotiate a deal that pays them and their named plaintiffs well, but delivers
little to nothing to their other clients.").
192.

See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 2017).

193. ANDREW J. PINCUS, WHAT'S WRONG WITH SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS?:
THE COST TO INVESTORS OF TODAY'S PRIVATE SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SYSTEM FAR
OUTWEIGHS ANY BENEFITS, U.S. CHAMBER: INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (Feb. 5, 2014),
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Securities-Class-ActionsFinall.pdf
[https://perma.cc/43HZ-Y45N].
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that juries will give draconian awards.1 9 4 Even settling the case can
result in a large sum of money being paid out, depending on how
many members are involved in the class action.
In most of the cases mentioned in this Note, the defendant companies immediately offered a year of free credit-monitoring services to the clients whose
personal information had been breached. 9 6 The proposed balancing
test helps incentivize this behavior by allowing companies to focus
their resources on preventing fraud rather than focusing on potential
threats of litigation due to a lower standing threshold. Further, the
balancing test gets rid of the analysis that if companies provide free
credit-monitoring services, then they must believe the third party who
accessed the personal information intends to misuse it.'97
Lastly, as previously mentioned, a circuit split can lead to forumshopping.
When possible, plaintiffs would likely pick the forum
which would grant them standing to move forward with their case.
This could lead to plaintiffs filing their cases in certain forums, which
undoubtedly are already swamped with cases. Having a uniform
standing requirement among the circuits would help eliminate this
possibility.
B. Impact the ProposedBalancing Test Will Have on the Federal
Courts
Under the current system, judicial review at the pleading stage
requires the determination of whether the substantive merits of the
case, as presented in the complaint, meet the standing requirements
2
set forth by common lawo.
" As stated throughout this Note, judges
have a hard time determining where the line is for meeting the
standing requirements. The balancing test essentially gets rid of the
watered-down standard-that an increased risk of identity theft is
sufficient to satisfy the "injury in fact" requirement of Article III
standing- promoted by the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Cir194. Gregory Brown, What are Class Actions and How Do They Impact Businesses?,
BROWN & CHARBONNEAU, LLP (July 25, 2017), https://www.bc-l1p.com/class-actions-impact-

businesses [https://perma.cc/3SNR-NZVT].
195. Id.
196. See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2017); Galaria v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App'x. 384, 385 (6th Cir. 2016); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC,
794 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2015); Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40 (3d Cir. 2011);
Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010).
197. See Galaria,663 F. App'x. at 388; cf. Beck, 848 F.3d at 276 (holding that adopting
this rationale would discourage companies from providing such goodwill services because it
would cause them liability in court).
198. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
200. See Reinert, supra note 138.
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cuits.2 0 ' Thus, the balancing test would dispose of more cases at the
forefront and promote efficiency. Statistics have shown that a majority of cases already do not get to trial; specifically, in 2003, the number of civil cases in federal court was down to 1.7 percent. 2 0 2 This
number does not improve in state courts, where in 2010, 0.2 percent
of circuit court cases in Florida made it to trial.2 0 3 Ultimately, this
balancing test would save the plaintiffs, defendants, and the courts
time and money.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Hackers infiltrating personal information stored in companies'
databases is expected to increase in the coming years. 2 04 In 2015,
businesses were the target of 40 percent of security breaches.2 0 5 With
20
these statistics expected to grow higher in coming years,o
it is all
the more necessary to implement a uniform standing policy for databreach class action cases. In the midst of rapidly changing technological advances-which have allowed hackers easier access to consumers' personal information-a circuit split has occurred between the
Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits and the Third, Fourth, and
Eighth Circuits. 2 0 7 The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have
adopted a relaxed standing requirement which states that plaintiffs
need only to prove an increased risk of identity theft to satisfy Article
III standing. While the Supreme Court has set precedent that lowering
this minimum threshold for standing is improper, 20 s the circuit courts
have continued to rationalize a way around it. The Third, Fourth, and
Eighth Circuits follow more closely the Supreme Court's precedent, but
since the circuits are operating under different standing requirements,
opposing precedents remain among the courts.
One way to fix this circuit split is to implement a uniform statutory standing requirement. The proposed requirement consists of a
201. See Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 628-29 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Galaria,663 F.
App'x. at 388-89; Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 966 (7th Cir.
2016); Remijas, 794 F.3d at 696; Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1143 (9th Cir. 2010); Pisciotta v. Old
Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007).
202.

See Reinert, supra note 138.

203. See J. Mason Williams IV, What are the Odds a Case is Going to Trial?,
WIDERMAN MALEK (Jan. 3, 2013), https://legalteamusa.net/civillaw/2013/01/03/what-arethe-odds-a-case-is-going-to-triall [https://perma.cc/28NG-PGQC].
204/ See John DiGiacomo, Top Data Breaches of 2018: Hackers Find New Methods,
REVISION LEGAL (Aug. 27, 2018), https://revisionlegal.com/data-breach/2018-statistics/
[https://perma.cc/63J5-NW4U].

205. Id.
206. Id.
207.

See supra Part III.

208.

Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 416 (2013).

196

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:169

balancing test in which the courts are to weigh all applicable elements in deciding whether plaintiffs have met the standing threshold. This balancing test is intended to coincide with the precedent
already provided by the Supreme Court, and it attempts to set
boundaries that the Supreme Court would likely follow had they
granted certiorari to review the cases involved in the circuit split.
With the confusion displayed by the district and circuit courts, the
legislature would be the most appropriate governing body to set a
uniform standing standard in motion.

